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IH THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE

of
THOMAS A. BEAL, sometimes
known as T. A. Beal, Deceased.
ORSON H. BEAL, et al,
Appellants,

Case No.
7369

vs.
MATTIE BEAL HANSEN, et al,
Respondents.

Respondents' Brief
This is an appeal from the decree of final distribution heretofore made and entered by the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, in the Estate of Thomas A. Beal, deceased, on June 13, 1949.
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The appellants are all of the relatives of the
full blood of the deceased. The respondents are the
relatives of the half blood of said deceased, and
respondents contend that by virtue of Paragraph
Five, which in effect was stricken from said Will,
the heirs of the half blood as outlined in the decree
of distribution shall participate in and to the assets
of deceased's estate by virtue of the laws of succession as provided for by the compiled laws of Utah.

I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Thomas A. Beal, deceased, made his last will
on J\t1arch 13, 1941. He died on January 3, 1948.
His \Vife, Ida Peterson Beal, predeceased the death
of her husband and died on January 6, 1945. The
Will was admitted to probate and Letters of Administration with the Will Annexed, in accordance with.
the terms thereof, were issued to Berdella B. Evans
on March 20, 1948. In connection with this statement, we refer to the last Will and testament of
Thomas A. Beal, Deceased, on file herein and make
the same a part of this statement and particularly
refer to Paragraph Five thereof, which is as follows:
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''Fifth-In the cz•cnt that my wife and I
shall perish in a commpn catastrophe, or disaster, then and in such event, I give, devise,
and bequeath to the President of the University
of Utah for the School of Business the sum of
$500.00, and to the President of Snow College
for the Sno"v College a like amount, for the purchase of books in Business and Economics, for
the use and benefit of said schools in building
up their libraries. And in such case of death,
I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue
and remainder of my property, both real and
personal, of \vhatever kind the same may be, or
wherever situated, or to which I may be entitled, to my nearest of kin and my wife's nearest of kin. That is to say, to our brothers and
sisters, of the full blood, share and share alike,
it being understood that the children of any
said brother or sister now dead, or who may
predecease us, shall stand in the place of such
deceased brother or sister, and take a one-tenth
interest in the remainder therein devised and
bC'queathed. Further, in such case, I nominate
and appoint Carvel Mattsson the Executor of
my last Will and Testament, to serve without
bond, and I hereby revoke any and all former
wills by me made." (Italics ours.)
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The only issue involved in this matter is whether
or not the contingency as outlined in Paragraph
Five of deceased's vVill is a condition precedent and
failed to occur and by reason of such failure, the
will as to Paragraph Five is inoperative.

II.
ARGUMENT
PorNT 1
We contend that by virtue of the express terms
and condition as contained in Paragraph Five of
said Will, it is not subject to judicial construction
for the reason that the terms and wording are concise and not ambiguous in any respect and that said
terms and the language en1ployed leave no doubt
whatever as to the intention of testator. Section
101-2-1, Utah Code 1943, reads:
"A vvill rnust be construed according
to the intention of the Testator. Where
his intention cannot have effect to its fullest
extent, it must have effect as far as possible."
Section 101-2-27, Utah Code 1943, reads:
"If a devisee or legatee dies during
the' lifetime of the Testator, the testamen-
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tary disposition to him fails unless an intention appears to substitute some other
in his place except as provided in Section
101-1-33."
Section 101-2-30, Utah Code 1943, reads:
"A condition precedent in a will is one
which is required to be fulfilled before a
particular disposition takes effect."
Section 101-2-31, Utah Code 1943, reads:
"'vnere a testamentary disposition is
made upon a condition precedent, nothing
vests until the condition is fulfilled except
where such fulfillment is impossible in
which case the disposition vests unless the
condition vvas the sole motive thereof and
the impossibility was unknovvn to the testator or arose from an unavoidable event
subsequent to the executio~ of the will."
The vVill in question is unambiguous, 'clear and
to the point and raises no question as to the Testator's intention in the premises. He first directs
that all of his just debts and funeral expenses be
paid and that he be buried in accordance with his
station in life. He then gave and bequeathed to the
School of Business of the University of Utah his professional library but retained therefrom family records, books of account, and books of religion. He
thereaftPr gave and devised the rest of his entire
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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estate to his vvife, Ida Peterson Beal, who thereafter
predeceased Testator in death and of course, her
heirs cannot inherit in any event by virtue of the
Section of the Utah Code above set forth. Thereafter,
in Paragraph Four of the deceased's Will, he nominated and appointed his wife as Executrix of his
Will to act without bond.
The conditional element in said Will is confined
to Paragraph Five thereof and it will be noted that
in said Paragraph the common catastrophe or disaster was referred to specifically four distinct times,
to-wit: "In the event that my wife and I shall perish
in a common catastrophe or disaster, then and in
such event, I give, devise and bequeath . . . . . And
in such case of death, I give, devise and bequeath
..... Further, in such case . .... " (Italics ours.)
It will be further noted that the deceased bequeathed unto the University of Utah $500.00 and
. a like amount to Snow College vvhich bequests were
also based upon the condition precedent as contained in said Paragraph Five.
"The power of a Testator to give includes the right to withhold or to fix the
terms of a gift no matter how whimsical
or capricious they may be provided only
they do not in any way violate the law."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Holmes vs. Conn. Trust Dep. Co.,
92 Conn. 507, 103 At. 640.
In re Holbrook, 213 Pa. St. 93, 62
At. 368.
"The condition or stipulation so attaches to the devise as to become a part
of it and controls the terms on \Yhich the
enjoyment of the gift is to take effect or
be retained."
Holmes, Supra.
"The rule that courts favor testacy
rather than intestacy does not relieve courts
from obligation to construe language of
will according to legal effect of words used
and wills must be construed as written."

In re Searl's Estate, 186 Pac. 2d
913 ('Yash.)
In the case just cited above, the rule is the same
that the respondents contend for in this cause. In
the above case, Hon1er I. Searl and Edda Marie
Searl, \lvere husband and wife. Mrs. Searl made her
will. She devised and bequeathed to her husband
her estate, providing: "Ho\vever, in the event my
husband and I should meet death by accident or
otherwise at the same time or approximately the
same time, then it is my desire and will that all such
residue and remainder- of 1ny estate is to pass to,
and in the event of such happening, I do give, devise
anrl bequeath the same unto my sister, Mrs. Anna
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Florence Conwell, who is now a resident of Columbus, Ohio."
She appointed her husband as Executor. The
testatrix died on May 19. 1945; her husband filed
will for probate in June of said year, and he died
on July 5, 1945, or 47 days after his wife's death,
and the Court held that the word "approximately"
in testatrix' will giving residue to wife's sister if
husband and wife should die at approximately the
same time, would be assumed to have been employed in its customary sense of "nearly," and that
47 days subsequent was not approximately the same
time. Therefore, the condition precedent never occured.
In the case of Glover vs. Reynolds, 135 N.J.Eq.
113, 37 At. 2d 90 it was held that "The rule of presumption against intestacy cannot be used to justify
a revision of the clear language of a will where will
giving all Testatrix' property to her husband provided that 'in the event that my husband and myself die simultaneously regardless of the order of
passing, I give and bequeath my property as therein
specified' but made no provision for contingency if
husband predeceased Testatrix and will was inoperative to pass any of wife's estate where husband
predeceased Testratrix and property passed as in case
of intestacy."
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The Court stated: '·By her \vill, th~ testatrix
appears to have had in mind only two possible situations; to-·wit: That she \vould predecease her husband or that they \vould die simultaneously, or at
least contemporaneously. She completely overlooked
the contingency \vhich did occur. Her failure to anticipate this or in the alternative to execute a new
will in the four months which intervened between
the death of her husband and her death cannot now
be cured. This Court under the guise of construing
the Will will not write a new one. As has frequently
been pointed out in our decision, it may be that if
she could novv express her views, she \lvould wish her
estate to pass to the defendant beneficiaries but this
is of no moment here." "In the case of McDonald
us. Clermont, 107 N.J.Eq. 585, at page 589, 153 At.
601, 603, the Court of Errors and Appeals adopted
as its own view the following language of Vice-Chancellor Buchanan: 'He did not say it in his Will and
this Court cannot say it for him. It is regretful, but
after all, it is the Testator's own fault. The law froze
all possible safeguards about the execution of a \vill
so a man may be sure that his property will go in
accordance \Yith what he provides in his will; but the
law cannot, or at least does not, compel a man to
have his will drawn by someone who knovvs how'."
It will be noted that the terms of Paragraph
Five herein of Deceased's Will that nothing appears
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to the effect that the contingency as stated merely
is the reason for making the will that the devises
and bequests are based solely upon the contingency
named therein.
In the Matter of Porter, L.R. 2 P. & D. 22, 23,
cited in Note 71, 68 C.J. 631, where the Court
stated:
"It is the common feature of wills in
respect of which this sort of question arises,
that the testator therein refers to a possible
impending calamity in connection with his
will; and the question arises, whether he
intends to limit the operation of his will to
the time during which such calamity is imminent. If the language used by him can
be construed to mean that he refers to the
calamity and the period of time during
which it may happen as the reason for making the will, then the will is not condition~!; but if he refers to the calamity or the
possible occurrence of some event as a reason for a certain disposition of his property,
and mixed up the disposition with the
event so that one is dependent on the other,
then the court must hold the will to be conditional."
Malter of Porter, Supra.
It seems very evident that the Testator referred
to the calamity or the possible occurence of such
event as a reason for a certain disposition of his property, and he mixed up the disposition with the event
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and that one is dependent upon the other. As must
be noted in Paragraph Five, based upon such event,
he named the President of the University of Utah,
the President of Snow College, and to deceased's
nearest of kin and his "·ife's nearest of kin.
The writer respectfully submits that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree made
and entered by the trial court in this matter should
be upheld and affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

WM. L. BEEZLEY,
Attorney for Respondents.
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